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David A. Schrady, Ph.D. 
Chairman of the Department of 
Operations Research and 
Administrative Sciences 
David Schrady was born in Akron, Ohio, on 11 November 1939. He attended 
Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, Ohio, and received the Bachelor of 
Science degree in management science in June 1961. He also completed his 
graduate study at Case, receiving a Master of Science degree in operations 
research in June 1963, and his Ph.D. in November 1965. His master 1s thesis 
research was done under the direction of Dr. Maurice W. Sasieni in the field 
of queueing theory, and his Ph.D. research was in the area of Markov renewal 
processes under the direction of Dr. Burton V. Dean. 
He has been employed by the IBM Corporation and the Boeing Company. 
While a doctoral candidate at Case, he taught in the areas of accounting 
and operations research. 
In October 1965 Professor Schrady joined the faculty of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, as a member of the Department 
of Operations Research and Administrative Sciences. His current research 
interests are in the general area of logistics and mathematical inventory 
theory. He spent the academic year 1970-71 in the Operations Research 
Branch of the Mathematical and Infonnation Sciences Division of the Office of 
Naval Research. 
Professor Schrady is a member of the Operations Research Society of 
America, a member of the ORSA Education Committee since 1967, and its 
chairman in 1971-72, and was 1970-72 Director of the Program of Visiting 
Lecturers in Operations Research. He is also a member of the Institute for 
Management Sciences, Tau Beta Pi, and Sigma Xi. He also serves as a con-
sultant to several organizations. 
Professor Schrady was appointed Chainnan of the Department of Opera-
tions Research and Administrative Sciences in April 1974. 
FACULTY COMMENT 
by D. A. Schrady, Chairman 
Department of Operations Research 
and Administrative Sciences 
My comments are addressed to the recent renaming and renumbering of 
the management curricula. At the request of the Chief of Naval Education 
and Training last spring, the Management curriculum was renamed the 
Administrative Science curriculum. Further, the Communications Management 
curriculum name was changed to Information Systems (Teleconmunications). 
Finally, the Computer Systems Management curriculum was renamed Information 
Systems (Computer). The Systems Acquisition Management curriculum name 
remains unchanged. 
Now with respect to the curriculum numbering system, there is a big 
change in the 817 program. Essentially, each option of the 817 program 
has been given a separate curriculum number and there are two additions 







Infonnation Systems (Computer) 
Information Systems (Telecommunications) 
Systems Acquisition Management 
Administrative Science 
827 Material Management 
837 Financial Management 
847 Manpower & Personnel Management 
857 Organizational Development 










*The location, grade, designator, and billet title for all P-coded 
billets are given in the current edition of the Annual Naval Officer 
Billet Summary, a copy of which is available in the Aciiiinistrative and 
Computer Sciences Curricular Office. 
The 857 curriculum in Organizational Development is proposed by Pers-6 
to help implement the Human Resources Management program within the Navy 
by training a cadre of officers with the 9620 P-code. The 867 curriculum, 
Education and Training, is being proposed by CNET. The officer graduating 
from this proposed curriculum would have a 9630 P-code and the utilization 
billets would be in CNET, the training centers, and ROTC programs. 
Currently, the proposed 867 curriculum is being developed by a 
committee consisting of the assistant curricular officer, LCDR Peter Browne; 
the Administrative Science academic associate, Professor Richard Elster; 






and adult learning theory. In general, all our curricula are developed and 
evolved by a c0111Tiittee consisting of the curricular officers, the academic 
associate, and Operations Research and Administrative Sciences Department 
faculty members representing the major discipline areas of the curr i culum. 
This permits the service needs and academic skills to be meshed into a 
coherent curriculum structure. 
A word might also be useful about the curriculum sponsors. The 
sponsors are now known as subspecialty consultants. Each curriculum 
has a formal Navy consultant and, ideally, curriculum revisions with 
the consultant are conducted annually. Through the use of the primary 
and secondary consultants, the adequacy of curricula in meeting express 
needs of the services and inputs or suggestions for improvement of cur-
ricula are formalized. In addition to formal curriculum reviews, a 
number of informal contacts with the various consultants go on throughout 










Primary Subspecialty Consultant 
Information Systems Division, Ofc. of the CNO (NOP-91) 
COMNAVTELECOM 
Chief of Naval Material 
Chief of Naval Material 
Dir. of Navy Program Planning, Ofc. of the CNO (NOP-090) 
Chief of Naval Personnel 
Chief of Naval Personnel 
Chief of Naval Education & Training 
Many students are concerned that there is virtually no FY75 quota 
for Manpower and Personnel Management. The probable reason is the re~ 
assessment of the inventory of officers currently holding the 9610 P-code. 
The Personnel Management option comes back with modest quotas for FY76, 
according to currently available information. The FY76 Postgraduate Selec-
tion Board, by the way, will be selecting to the 827, 837, etc., programs 
rather than to 817 in general. In general, the Administrative Science 
programs, which saw a reduction from three sections to one section in the 
July 1974 input, will show considerable strength in the FY76 education plan. 
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MARKETING ASPECTS OF THE ALL-
VOLUNTEER FORCE 
by R. C. N.i.cha.tf.on 
Tlti.6 papeJL e.xa.mi.nu the. pMc.Ul> o 6 mee.t-i.ng manpoweJL 
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6 oJr.c.e. 6Mm a. maJtk.e.t.i.ng po.in:t o 6 vi.ew. 
R. C. NICHOLSON, CDR, USN; B.S., 1973, Naval Post-
graduate School; candidate for M.S. in Computer Systems 
Management. 
Tlu..6 pa.pe.Jr. tt.tU l>ubmi.tte.d .to PMoe6.6att. Ja-U.y 601r. Ma1t.fz.e;Ung 
S:t:Jr.a..teg y, MN 4172 • 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 27, 1973, six months ahead of schedule, Secretary Laird 
announced the end of the draft. The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) was supported 
by libera l s because it ended the so-called economic rent that had been im-
posed on the nation 1 s youth and by conservatives because they felt it would 
make foreign policy less dependent on public opinion, particularily in view 
of the recent unpopularity of the Vietnam war. However, no nation had ever 
maintained a volunteer force of the size proposed and frequent questions as 
to its feasibility were raised by critics, many of which have yet to be 
answered. In an article entitled 11The New Society, 11 Admiral Zumwalt called 
the AVF 11 • •• one of the great social experiments of the post-World War II 
era •• • 11 and pointed out that 11for 32 years with the exception of thirteen 
months in 1947-48, we all--civilian society, military organization and govern-
ment planner have operated on the premise that the draft is a fact of life 
0 
and an unchanging constant. 11 (1: 17] In fact, by November, the Anny had 
missed their recruiting goals for the ninth consecutive month (2:65] and 0 
officials were predicting shortages of from 15,000-20,000 men by June 1974 
[3:16], in spite of greatly increased pay and allowances, advertising and 
recruiting efforts. It seems that the military, having been handed man-
power through draft-motivated volunteers was simply not equipped to compete 
in the labor market against finns utilizing more sophisticated marketing 
techniques. Dr. Ralph Sanders, reviewing the extensive use of systems 
analysis,points out that most DOD studies relative to the AVF centered 
around a pay approach utilizing 1 abor economics and the related II theory of 
elasticity" to detennine its feasibility [4 :111]. Obversely, pay is only 
one factor that must be considered in the multidimensional process of 




not specifically related to the study of marketing management, it appears 
that many of the solutions to the problem of 11selling the military as a 
profession" to the nation's youth can be profitably studied in a marketing 
context. It is my intent, then, to review the military manpower problem 
from a marketing point of view as a matter of interest and to determine if 
that approach offers possible solutions or insights that may prove helpful 
to defense planners. 
Econometric Modeling 
A review of more than sixty technical reports held in the Naval Post-
graduate School library and the original Gates Commission report (SJ re-
vealed that most researchers approach the problem of obtaining volunteers 
for the AVF from an increased compensation point of view. Unfortunately, 
these models vary considerably, depending on the functional form utilized 
and on the variables considered. The original pathfinding work utilizing 
this type of modeling to study the AVF was done by Anthony c. Fischer [6] 
and has been modified by others to include new variables in an attempt to 
"explain" the apparent weak response by draft-age youth to greatly increased 
compensation for the lower-grade members of the four services. These 
models use multiple regression techniques to detennine the relationship 
between pay, unemployment rate, civilian compensation and a variety of 
other factors in an attempt to derive the supply elasticity of volunteers 
relative to various pay levels. In separate studies prepared for the Gates 
Commission, estimates of elasticity varied widely from 1.24 to 2.36 [7: II-
2-22, II-1-l] and one researcher cited many puzzling inconsistencies in 
warning readers that, "extrapolating them beyond the present, when the 
draft priority is based on a lottery, or to periods when there is no draft 
should be done with extreme caution." [7:II-3-23] It appears that the lack 
of good empirical data due to the effect of the draft on the number of 
volunteers,made it extremely difficult to make a definitive finding as to 
the cost of 11buying11 volunteers in a no-draft situation. In any case, 
estimates for attaining a 2.65 million-man volunteer force range from 2.1 
to 8.3 billion a year. Further, in a paper prepared for the Institute of 
Naval Studies, the authors explain that original models failed to consider 
the necessity for including the allocation of recruiting resources in 
the models and that supply elasticities with respect to pay are likely to 
be much lower [8:6] than they were previously believed to be. 
In marketing, "Pricing is one of the most readily available, yet in 
a sense, most seldom used tools of management." [9:329] One reason managers 
tend to underutilize pricing is that it is easily perceived by competitors 
and leads to more drastic competitive reactions. [Ibid.] In a sense, the 
military has a great competitive disadvantage with regard to price competi-
tion in the job market. With the exception of pro-pay and variable re-
enlistment bonuses, which apply primarily to the reenlistment rather than 
to the original enlistment decision, any pay raise given to the military is 
generally global to the entire force rather than local to the group to be 
attracted. A further exception to this generalization existed before pay-
scales for entry-level recruits and junior officers were aligned with 
those of 11career 11 members of the services . Those extremely low wages, 
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which incidentally qualified some junior members for welfare payments, put 
the military in a distinctly inferior position competitively upon entering 
the nondraft environment. However, once those discontinuities were 
corrected, any further pay raises would necessarily have to be given to 
all pay grades so as not to create pay inversions (i.e., an E-1 being paid 
more than an E-2). In fact, pay increases to junior members usually re-
sult in even larger pay increases to seniors. When extrapolated from an 
econometric model prepared by Alan E. Fechter for the Institute for Defense 
Analysis, the pay raise required to obtain the 125-140 thousand enlistments 
required by the Army in 1974, applied to the entire enlisted armed force, 
results in a marginal cost of from $105,882 to $391,304, depending on wage 
elasticity, for each added recruit over the number that could be obtained 
when the previous pay rates were in effect. Although the raising of recruit 
pay scales to a level commensurate with those of career forces was clearly 
indicated, additional raises for the purpose of increasing the number of 
volunteers would appear to have very little effect per defense dollar expendi-
ture (ceter i s paribus). This limitation stems from the egalitarian nature of 
the armed forces which decrees that all first-class petty officers have the 
same stature and that promotions come with time and experience and not due 
to any special skill. Of course the services have some discretion in award-
ing promotions and special pay but not nearly to the degree that civilian 
employers do, for they can hire individuals into any job depending on that 
individual's skill or talent. 
Therefore, it appears that econometric modeling is a useful tool in a 
li mited range but that an attempt to extrapolate findings too far may result 
in misleading findings. Also, while wages are a strong motivator for the 
volunteer, overemphasis on increased wages as a recruiting tool will result 
in suboptimization of the manpower recruiting problem. Emphasis on wage 
scales has resulted from the ability of system analysts to easily quantify 
assumptions pertaining to them in the forn, of a mathematical function . 
Further, the expertise for this type of analysis has been readily available 
to the Deparbnent of Defense. While marketing managers are looking to 
operations analysis to solve an increasing number of problems [8:10], it 
may behoove military managers to look toward the less rigorous descriptive 
approaches such as the Howard-Sheth or Nicosia models and pattern recogni-
tion [8:74] to improve their understanding of the military manpower market. 
Also, once a new recruit has volunteered, he is a ready source of infonna-
tion as to what factors changed or enforced his attitude toward enlisting 
in a particular service. Such information could be stored in a data bank 
and applied in a Amstutz-type simulation model to evaluate a range of 
incentives that might be offered by the services. In any case, it is clear 
that money alone is not enough to achieve the number of enlistments required 
to man the AVF and other nonpay incentives must be investigated. 
Nonpay Incentives 
Such incentives could be likened to product improvement in the marketi ng 
world. The approach is to find out what improvements would make the services 






feasible. Some incentives have traditionally been offered by the services 
although they are not necessarily most effective. A pathfinding work in 
this regard was the Gilbert Youth Survey [9] which was utilized extensively 
by the Department of Defense in implementing the AVF. That report indicates 
that at the time the survey was taken, young people were most interested in 
learning a trade or skill in the service but that educational opportunity, 
travel and pay exerted an important influence. Each of these product im-
provement categories must be considered in view of its cost, however. The 
Navy has emphasized the benefit of its skill training through the guaranteed 
schools program. Before enlisting, certain qualified men are guaranteed a 
school quota upon completion of boot camp. Prior to final enlistment the 
recruiter telephones and actually books a quota with a class convening date 
for the individual. However, the majority of enlistees seem to take their 
training, serve the minimum required time and then get a job in civilian 
industry where the pay is greater. On a visit, officials at United Air-
craft's maintenance base expressed concern to me that the military was not 
training as many aircraft mechanics as before and they might have to train 
their own. Therefore, one wonders if it might not be advantageous to the 
military to offer skill training only to those willing to sign on for long 
enlisbnents. Any such action would of course diminish the attractiveness 
of such training to many individuals. The same rationale also applies to the 
G. I. bill. Although it is a strong enlistment incentive, it is also a 
strong influence for a young man to leave the service and go back to school 
where the living is easy and there are plenty of girls. It can be argued 
also, that habitability improvements, in addition to costing a great deal 
of money, diminish the effectiveness of our ships due to the extra space and 
weight required. Further, some Army officers have expressed concern that 
soft living in improved anny barracks might make troops less effective in 
battle due to the relatively poor conditions they will necessarily experience 
in the field [10]. Although such fears are probably unwarranted, it is im-
portant to weigh all factors, not just monetary costs, associated with 
attracting volunteers as to their long range effect on military effectiveness. 
Again, descriptive models might be effective in keeping track of the con-
trollable variables. 
Supply of Vo1unteers 
A recent study by the Brookings Institute shows that to meet recruiting 
quotas of 365,000 men per year, the services must sign up one-third of all 
available males, ages 19 to 23. They count as available only those who 
meet mental and physical requirements and who are not "locked in" some other 
occupation [10:388]. To make matters worse, census figures show that the 
number of males in that age group will peak and start to decline in the 
next decade. Further, Pentagon studies show that two out of every five 
eligibles are already being signed up by the military [11:66]. If these 
figures are correct, recruiters are doing just about as well as they can 
and only a relaxation of standards will make it possible to meet requirements 
in the future. 
One way recruiters are meeting goals, particularly in the Army, is by 
recruiting more blacks. Although the total percentage of blacks is only 
eleven per cent in all the services, the Army percentage is 20 per cent and 
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rising. In fact, one-quarter of al l army enlistments in 1973 were black 
[10:387]. Another way to increase supply is to take in more women. Again, 
the total percentage of women in the service is not impressive, but the per-
centage of new recruits is. The Army has opened up 434 of 484 specialties 
to women and the number of women in the service is expected to double by 1978. 
Defense officials say that recruiters see the signing on of women as one way 
to make up for declining enlistments now that the draft has ended [12:82]. 
Another substitution proposed by the Gates Commission is the civilianiza-
tion of more and more military jobs. Again, civilians can be hired later- 0 ally into jobs at sufficiently high wages without the requirement of 
raising general pay scales. However, the hiring of civilians is to a degree 
self-defeating in the long run. In the Navy, civilians have taken over some 
of the jobs previously reserved for sailors rotating ashore. The result has 
been longer sea tours and many sailors are leaving after their first enlist-
ment as a result of this arduous duty. 
Trading Effectiveness and Quality for Numbers 
John A. Sullivan, in a study prepared for the Gates Commission found 
that "the percentage of the true volunteers (which were obtained from the 
surveys) clearly shows that individuals with less education and hence poorer 
civilian job opportunities are more likely to enlist in the absence of a 
draft. 11 [7: I-2-6] Indeed, the Marine Corps has been forced to accept more 
high school dropouts in order to meet requirements. Because the overall 
percentage of high school graduates in the Corps had dropped to 52 per cent, 
they were forced to reject all but 44 per cent of their recruiting quota to 
meet the newly imposed congressional requirement of not less than fifty-five 
per cent high school graduates [13]. During the last three months of 1973, 
only 41 per cent of Army volunteers had completed high school and their over-
all percentage dropped to 54 per cent [14:36]. This drop in number of high 
school graduates comes after a steady increase since 1957, required, according 
to the services to meet the increasing complexi~y of modern weapon systems. 
A study for the Air Force by Eli Flyer almost ten years ago indicated that a 
high school diploma is a more significant predictor of adjustment to the 
military than mental group [7:I-2-27]. But mental group requirements, after 
rising for a decade, have been dropping too. Curtis W. Tarr,in an article 
written for the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings before the draft ended 
asserted that: 
"Because volunteerism increases among the lower mental categories, it 
is obvious t hat recruiters will encounter greater difficulty enlisting 
the number of men they want in groups one and two, compared to three 
and four. Conversely, there is a temptation to make up for the 
deficit of men in higher mental categories •.• thus the total character 
of the force changes rather slowly. 11 [15:58] 
According to Stuart H. Loory, writing for the New York Times, the change 
hasn't been all that slow; in fact,the rapid increase in group IV's entering 
the Army alarmed Congress to the degree that they imposed an 18 per cent limit 





On the other hand, studies prepared for The President's Commission on 
an All-Volunteer Anned Force suggest that "when potential supplies exceed 
recruitment quotas, the services have hi'storically rationed the available 
spaces by raistng mental qualifications standards and dentin~ enlistment to 
individuals in the lowest acceptable mental category •.• " [7:I-1-37] The same 
study asserts that DOD's project 100,000 which gave special training to a 
number of group IV personnel (10-30th percentile mental group} was a success 
in that most of them completed their tours successfully [7:1-1-46]. Those of 
us who had such men assigned to us know, however, that most of them were 
simply carried along by their supervisors because their limitations were 
realized. Additionally, they detracted from the duties of first-line 
supervisors who had to take care of them. Therein lies the problem, how 
do you measure requirements when there is no specific output, or as further 
stated in the above report, "it could be argued that the Army with its lower 
mental standards is forced to 'make do' with low quality recruits and thus 
has a less effective force. Given the difficulty of measuring defense 
'output' there is no objective way to verify or refute this argument." [7: 
I-2-17] If in fact the services can effectively utilize a greater per-
centage of group IV personnel, it would be wasteful to insist on higher 
mental standards, however, the matter should be carefully studied before 
simply trading quality for numbers. 
There is some concern too that the services are becoming too soft. The 
relaxed regulations of the "Zumwalt Navy" have been blamed for race riots and 
poor discipline and several writers have questioned whether the Army can 
provide disciplined fighters in the event of a war. Michael T. Klare 
describes situations involving combat avoidance wherein 11 ••• a group of G.I.'s 
refused hazardous duty, but later agreed to perform less risky tasks after 
negotiating with their officers." (10:385] He further asserts that the 
Army is offering a "'contract' •.• we'll offer you job security, travel, and 
adventure, and a middle-class standard of life in return for your promise to 
carry out orders and, if necessary, to fight at the direction of your 
officers." [Ibid.] Captain Timothy Jeffrey, U.S. Army, writing for Military 
Review, a magazine published by the U.S. Anny and General Staff College, 
stated that the Anny has gone too far in trying to change their image from 
a fighting force where people get killed to a nice kind of organization to 
belong to and decries their new slogan, "The Anny Wants to Join You.11 He 
cites Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance in claiming that the old 
Anny's tough initiation, training and discipline gives the individual a 
better perception of the group and a loyalty that might make the difference 
in battle [16]. Along the same lines, Michael Malloy writes in the National 
Observer that "The recruits don I t yell 'ki 11 ! ki 11 ! ' any more in anny 
bayonet practice. New training manuals rule out 'indiscreet slogans. 1 So 
now a lot of troops yell 'yah! yah!' It's in better taste." [17:10] Truly, 
many of the old "chicken regs" had long since seen their day but we should be 
a little careful in changing the character of a fighting force, to create a 
marketable image. 
Selling the New Military 
With the marginal cost of each new recruit rising it is only natural 
to put more effort into promotion. In a study entitled The All-Volunteer 
Anny, the authors state in conclusion that "the establishment of an image 
9. 
is both an inside and outs ide job . Advertising, salesmanship, publicity 
and all the other techniques of image creation are valuable and essential." 
[18] The Anny alone has increased its advertising budget from 3.1 million 
in 1970 to 26.7 million in 1973. Their approach is to appeal to youth and 
they have concentrated their campaign in the youth-oriented media such as 
Playbo~ Magazine. In spi te of greatly increased budgets, however, advertising 
effectiveness has not been particularily spectacular. In fact, the Anny told 
the Armed Services Committee that 11it took $3600 worth of magazine advertising 
for each recruit" and that "of the 280 magazines ads it placed in fiscal 1972 O 
no 'creditable enlistments• were brought by 137 ads. 11 [19:65] The Marines 
have adopted a total marketing view in hiring J. Walter Thompson agency, 
who created their most effective slogan "The Marines are Looking for a Few 
Good Men.11 According to Lt. Col. E. C. Johnson, who is head of recruitment 
advertising, they are using virtually every service that Thompson has to offer 
and probably a few the agency had not thought of before the Marine Corps came 
along. Unlike the Anny, the Marines do the bulk of their advertising on public 
service (or free} advertising space and are spending their dollars on good 
copy. It is interesting that the Marines are the one service that has not 
tried to change their image, but has rather concentrated on their segment 
of the job market [20:13]. A survey of advertis ing effectiveness conducted 
by Mathematica, an operationa l research firm, found that TV was the most 
cost effective media followed by posters and billboards. They found that the 
best advertising was that which was most believable and that specifically the 
Anny's was least believable while the Navy's had the most creditability. 
Interestingly, they found that "despite the increase in awareness and more 
than tripling the inquiry rate, studies done by several groups including 
Mathematica cannot demonstrate any significant increase in army enlistments 
due to the advertising campaign.11 [21] Perhaps the Anny's advertisements 
are creating awareness and knowledge but are not completing the promotional 
process recommended by Russell Colley by causing conviction and action [9:445]. 
The Anny has detennined that, although not originally believed to be so, 
the number of recruits is greatly affected by the number of recruiters in a 
given area [11:63]. Accordingly, the Anny increased its recruiting force 
by seventy per cent. However, some of them have been relieved for falsifying 
records such as mental tests in order to meet unrealistic quotas [10:388]. 
The Navy originally allocated recruiters to the various naval districts 
based on market potentia l , utilizing an estimate of qualified military 
available (QMA) between the ages of 17 to 21. A study conducted by James T. 0 
Bennett at George Washington University determined that in spite of estimates, 
the number of recruits varied greatly from district to district and that a 
better measure for allocating recruiting resources would be marginal pro-
ductivity, utilizing historical data as a basis. Mr. Bennett's findings 
were principally that the wage elasticity for recruits was really much lower 
than previously thought when optimum allocation of other recruiting resources 
utilizing marginal analysis was considered [22:12]. However, the Navy picked 
up the ball and in fact revised its recruiter allocation policy to add 
recruiters where productivity per recruiter (marginal productivity} was high, 
taking them away from districts where marginal productivity was low. Another 
researcher, improving on Mr. Bennett's work,suggested allocation of all 




forecasts. He further suggested utilizing an input from the recruiter when 
making the forecast in order to give him added motivation to meet the goals 
[23:20]. If, as Army experience suggests, a great deal can be gained by 
improvement in our recruiting forces, such improvement may be much more cost 
effective than a general wage increase. The Navy is trying to improve re-
cruiter effectiveness primarily by stressing the assignment of quality 
personnel to recruiting posts and through allocation policies as mentioned 
previously. Recently, the Navy has been sending recruiters to civilian 
sales schools to improve their techniques. Still there is much improvement 
that can be made. Traditionally, recruiting duty has been utilized as a 
"twilight tour" for retiring senior enlisted personnel to allow them to 
settle in a place of their choice prior to getting out of the service. 
Even though these are outstanding men they are often more occupied with 
making a place for themselves rather than getting new men for the Navy. 
Additionally, it seems reasonable to assume that a potential enlistee would 
relate better to a younger man than to one thirty years his senior. One 
of the Army's top recruiters, Sergeant Pat Rishor, is 34. He is old enough 
to have been around in the Army, but yet young enough to relate to young 
people. Further, he loves the Army and talks straight to potential volun-
teers about what the Army has done for him and what it can do for them. 
Like any good salesman, he is sold on his product. Marketing managers know 
that salesmen should have certain specific traits and many have devised 
tests to pick potentially good ones. Among other things, the salesman or 
recruiter projects the organization's image. He should project confidence, 
be respected [9:396] and be possessed with empathy and ego. Recruiters, 
therefore should be picked not only for their operational perfonnance but also 
on the basis of traits that have been identified in successful predecessors. 
It would appear feasible in this regard to develop aptitude tests that would 
reliably pick outstanding recruiters. Also, incentives such as bonuses 
utilized in the marketing world should be investigated to see if their use 
might improve recruiting rates. Finally, it has been determined that 
potential enlistees want to be told the truth. Almost any recruiter will 
tell you that his worst enemy is a dissatisfied customer. People coming 
back from the services are more experienced than their peers back home and 
are likely to become opinion leaders [9:460] when they return to their former 
group. A rewarding experience in the militaryt whether they decide to make 
it a career or not could be a very useful asset to be utilized in recruiting 
tomorrow's forces. 
High Turnover Rates Versus a Career Force 
Secretary Bo Calloway of the Army has recently said that it is a mis-
conception on many peoples' parts that the Army wants a strictly career 
force. In fact many defense officials want to keep the age of the military 
low, thus, they say, ensuring a youthful and vigorous force. This concept 
of course ignores the fact that many of our most successful leaders in 
World War II were brought back from retirement. In any case, for what it 
is worth, the youthful and vigorous force could be compared with the 
marketing concept of planned obsolescence and it too needs reevaluation. 
Recruiting and retention are not necessarily mutually supportive concepts. 
Several conflicts, such as the fact that although trade training and 
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educational opportunities may bring recruits in, they also cause individuals 
to leave the service to take advantage of them, have already been mentioned. 
However, with the numbers of 19 to 21 year olds in the population declining 
and given the fact that the propensity to enlist lessens as an individual 
gets older, the services must continue to emphasize re-enlistment, or return 
customers in a marketing sense, as an increasingly important source of man-
power. It has been said that the Navy enlists a single person but reenlists 
a family [24:1-2] and it is clear that an important factor as to whether a 
person stays in the military is his spouses• influence. If in fact married 
personnel are the primary target for reenlistment, then the effect of new 
barracks and better conditions for single enlisted men is to a degree wasted. 
The Navy is extremely concerned about retention. In an effort to determine 
the impact of career counseling a study was contracted for which studied the 
impact that specially trained career counselors had on 2,744 navy famil ies 
[24:2-1]. The study segmented the market into two groups, on the assumption 
that those with over eight years were career-oriented. One of the most 
tnteresting findings was that wives of the over-eight year group were most 
satisfied. It is possible then that the old practice of reenlisting a man's 
wife may have merit. It is also possible then that extra dollars spent on 
family housing, new commissaries and other family-oriented benefits may pro-
duce greater marginal benefi ts than dollars spent to enlist the marginal 
volunteer. Additionally, decreases in training costs and the increased 
experience gained might add to the value received. In short, the military 
should conduct marginal cost studies in order to dete rmine where additional 
manpower dollars should be spent rather than bl indly increasing wages. 
In the past few months, recruiting statistics have begun to look more 
favorable. The Army attributes its gains to better recruiting techniques and 
a sharp upturn in re-enlistments [25:6]. Other explanations might include 
the end of the Vietnam conflict, improved public opinion toward the military, 
a growing rate of unemployment and job uncertainty or in a negative sense may 
have resulted from some of the previously mentioned efficiency tradeoffs. In 
any case, the services should not be lulled into thinking their manpower 
problems are over. Current success does not mean a lessening acceptability 
of the draft as a backup except in national emergency. Therefore, the 
military must continually analyze the variables involved in attaining the 
AVF and ensure they are getting the most effectiveness for their money. 
Many of the concepts associated with the 11art 11 of marketing management appear 
to be potentially u~eful in conducting this analysis. Specifically, de-
scriptive modeling, marginal analysis, advertising and sales strategy seem 
to have specific application in the manpower procurement arena. Therefore, 
given that the all-volunteer force is here to stay, it would appear that 
marketing management is an important concept to be included in the Naval 
Officer's bag of tricks . On that basis I would recommend marketing as a 
required rather than a sanetimes offered course in the management curriculum 
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A train engineer causes a train wreck that kills 60 people and tells 
the police, "I didn't see the signal." One car hits another and kills 4 
people. The driver's excuse?--"! didn't see the stoplight. 11 A radar 
operator fails to report to the Commanding Officer that a 11bogey" is 
approaching the ship, and says, "I didn't see him on the scope." These, 
and countless other similar incidents, occur daily. Why do people fail to 
detect important signals? Under what circumstances do they fail to detect 
the signals? What can be done to ensure that the signals will be detected? 
These questions introduce the subject of this paper--vigilance and the 
decrease in vigilance (called vigilance decrement}. 
Vigilance has been described in several ways: as perfonnance on 
monitoring tasks, as attention over extended periods of time, and as a 
readiness to respond to infrequent, low-intensity signals occurring at 
unpredictable intervals. [6] 
Vigilance in lookout duty, sentry duty, radar and sonar watch-standers, 
and many other military duties is essential. A person's life may literally 
depend upon his vigilance in his task. Required vigilance in tasks is not 
confined to the military. It is also required in industry--in monitoring 
the displays of automated systems, in detecting flaws in units coming off 
an assembly line, in proofreading a manuscript . Furthermore, vigilance is 
required in operating automobiles, ships, aircraft, and almost all kinds of 
machinery. Unfortunately, human beings in general do not maintain vigilance 
for long periods of time. It has been found that during the first 20 to 
25 minutes of a vigilance task, involving required responses to an infre-
quent stimulus (5-20 per hour}, that the probability of correct response is 
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between 90% and 95%. During the second 20-25 minutes, and for subsequent 
eeri ods of time, the probabi lity of correct response drops to 50% to 60%. 
ll,10] The drop in tile efficiency of the vigilance performance is referred 
to as a "vi gi 1 ance decrement. 11 This paper wi 11 look at some of the factors 
which are thought to cause vigilance decrement, will examine some of the 
theories that attempt to explain vigilance decrement and will outline some 
techniques that might be used in an effort to decrease the vigilance decre-
ment. 
Prior to World War II human vigilance was not thought to be much of a 
problem. The military thought, for example, that sentries would not have a 
difficult time in maintaining alertness since the threat of possible loss of u 
life should have been suff i cient motivation. With t he advent of the desi gn 
of new and complex monitoring equipment, such as radar and sonar, it was 
found that despite the increased capabilit i es of the equipment, efficiency 
decreased in many situations to a point at which the systems were of little 
or no value. [5] Consequently, since the start of World War II there has 
been a great deal of interest and research in the area of vigilance and 
vigilance decrement and, coinci dentally, in the area of man-machine inter-
face. 
Many fact ors have been hypothesized to be causes, or at least contri-
butors to the causes of vigilance decrement. These factors i nclude fatigue, 
boredom, monotony, age, task difficulty, complex st imuli, stimuli frequency, 
and environmental factors . Examination of many of these factors and stud ies 
conducted on these fact ors as they affect vigilance decrement will be out-
lined in this paper, 
One of the effects of fatigue is a decrease in vigilance. A.G. Bills, 
as reported by Grandjean [8],has shown that people cannot concentrate 
continuously on mental or motor activities . After a certain period of stress, 
interruptions occur and reaction times are increased. As fatigue increases, 
these interruptions bec001e more frequent and last longer. 
Boredom arises where the environment is lacking in external stimuli 
and it results in a feeling of dullness and tiredness which may increase to 
sleepiness. A decrease in vigilance occurs at the onset of boredom. As 
boredom increases, vigilance decreases even more, and more frequent errors 
will result. Monontonous activity will add to the factor of boredom. Grand-
jean [8] reported a study of the effects of monotony and boredom during a 
rhythmically paced activity. Over a ten-hour workday, the monotonous task 
led to a larger decrease in vigilance for every hour on the job. For example, 0 
for the first hour on the job the number of missed signals were about 4% of 
the total signals. After five hours the number of missed si gnals increased 
to almost 15%. A lunch break decreased this percentage somewhat but not 
back to the original 4%. The vigilance decrement again increased as the 
number of hours on the job increased. 
The effect of a person's age on vigilance tasks has been the subject 
of several studies. [10,ll] In general, the results of the studies show 
that vigilant perfonnance is not affected by a person's age until the age 
is over 60 years, at which time performance tends to decrease. [11] In 
an experiment by Talland [11] the effects on vigilance of persons 60 and 
older were studied. Talland attributed the vigilance decrement found in the 
experiment to the slowing down of scanning and decision processes of the 




Many types of stress such as noise, deprivation of sleep, extremes 
in environmental temperatures and extremes in stgnal strength and frequency 
have a negative effect on vigilance efficiency. [3,8] Grandjean has shown 
that acoustic stimuli detract more than any other sensory stimulus from the 
efficiency of vigilance tasks, and that unexpected and discontinuous noise 
distrubs vigilance more than continuous noise. 
The type, frequency and strength of the signal in vigilance tasks 
have been the subjects of many experiments. [3,8,11] As might be intuited, 
the results of most of the experiments show that acoustic signals detract 
from vigilance more than other types of signals; that the more frequent the 
signals are, the less the build-up of vigilance decrement (at least to the 
point that the signals become so frequent that response time becomes too 
short); and that the higher the intensity of the signal, the more likely 
the signal will be noticed and, therefore, the less likely an increase in 
the vigilance decrement. 
Another factor which contributes to an increase in the vigilance 
decrement was encountered by Talland [11] and Broadbent [3] in their 
experiments on vigilant watch-standing. The factor is known as expectancy. 
The studies showed that when persons reacted to random infrequent signals 
(a maximum of 15 per hour) there was a tendency on the part of the people 
to relax immediately after reaction to a signal, with the result that if 
two signals were received in close proximity to one another there was a 
high probability that the second signal would be missed. One of the conclu-
sions of the studies was that if signals were not 11expected11 the vigilance 
decrement would be increased. 
In summary, many factors have been shown to have an effect on the 
vigilant perfonnance of people in vigilance-required tasks. Some of these 
factors have been discussed above. Vigilance decrement has increasingly 
concerned experimenters and the number of studies, experiments and published 
reports have proliferated greatly in recent years. The studies and factors 
affecting vigilance decrement discussed above are by no means exhaustive but 
merely serve as a sampling of the type of studies being conducted and as an 
indication of the concern engendered in the study of vigilance performance 
in tasks. 
Two general theories have been proposed as attempts to explain the 
phenomenon of vigilance decrement. These theories are referred to as the 
Filter Theory and the Arousal Theory. 
Broadbent [3,4] offered a theory of vigilance based on the information-
processing characteristics of the human perceptual system. The theory was 
designed to explain the facts of classical conditioning and performance on 
repetitive tasks. His theory has become known as the Filter Theory. 
The Filter Theory assumes the human perceptual system to have a limited 
capacity and so be incapable of analyzing simultaneously all the information 
received by the sense organs. Of the total stimulation upon the system at 
any given time, only part is capable of initiating a response. Therefore, a 
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selective operation is perfonned upon the inputs to the system. Broadbent 
proposed that a filter, placed early in the nervous system, selects only 
part of the infonnation available and passes t his part on to the perceptual 
system. Normally, the filter selects necessary or relevant infonnation for 
the task being performed, so that infonnation will be selected primarily from 
the signal-producing display. The filter is assumed to have a permanent bias, 
however, in favor of channels which have not recently been active. Thus, 
after continuous observation from one source of information (the task), the 
filter will select information from other sources (external stimuli to the 
task). Broadbent states 11 ••• such breaks in the intake of task infonnation 0 
will be brief, but will increase in fre quency as the task is continued. One 
might therefore explain vigilance decrement by supposing that the signals 
arriving later in the task are more likely to fall in t hese brief instants 
and so be missed. 11 
The Filter Theory also assumes that certain properties of a stimulus 
will make it more likely to be selected from among its competitors and to 
continue to be selected if once chosen by chance. These properties are 
physical intensity, biological importance, and novelty. It is the property 
of novelty that the Filter Theroy emphasizes in explain i ng the results of 
vigilance experiments. As the time of a vigilance task is extended, 
repetitious stimuli from the vigilance display lose the i r novelty and there-
fore are less likely to be selected . Initially neglected sources of infor-
mation will become favored and stimuli external to the vigilance task will 
tend to dominate. The selection of irrelevant informati on allows the task 
stimuli to regain novelty and resume processing. This cycle of events occurs 
with greater frequency as the task progresses. 
In summary, the Filter Theory states that because of the limited capacity 
of the human perceptual system, a selective operat i on is performed on all 
inputs to that system. Dur ing a vigilance task the person will select 
irrelevant competing stimuli with increasing frequency as t he task progresses. 
The result will be a decrease in the percentage of signals detected--that is, 
an increase in the vigilance decrement. 
A theory somewhat contradictory to the Filter Theory has been proposed 
by D.O. Hebb [9]. This theory has come to be known as the Arousal Theory. 
Using the results of neurophysiological research that indicate that sensory 
impulses reach the brain cortex through two routes (a di rect and an indirect 
route), Hebb proposed that stimuli serve two different functions as a result 
of these two different routes to the cortex. The direct route, as proposed 
in the Arousal Theory, serves as a cue function which guides and controls 
behavior through an efficient transmission of infonnat ion. The indirect 
route serves as an arousal, or vigilance, funct i on for the cortex. The 
Arousal Theory assumes that the arousal function is necessary for organi zed 
activity . Hebb states " .•. without a foundation of arousal, the cue function 
cannot exist." Thus, the brain is assumed to require a certain level of 
external stimulation to make optimum use of the cues upon which efficient 
behavior depends. The arousal function is assumed to depend upon the 
variability of the stimuli. Hebb has stated that the normal variety of 
sensory stimulation has the function of maintaining arousal--alertness 





function is significantly affected. The monotony of the stimulus conditions 
in a vigilance task would then lead to lowered arousal, less efficient 
detection and to an increase in the vigilance decrement. J. Deese [7] 
supports the Arousal Theory and has stated " •.• the maintenance of a given 
level of vigilance in an observer depends to some extent upon stimulus 
events extrinsic to the observer." The problem of maintaining alertness 
under monotonous conditions was viewed by Deese as a problem in maintenance 
of a background stimulation input to offset the dissipation of a state of 
vigilance. 
The Filter Theory and the Arousal Theory are, as stated, somewhat 
contradictory. The presence of competing external stimuli on a vigilance 
task would be predicted to have opposite effects, depending upon which 
theory was used. The Filter Theory would predict that the existence of 
varied external stimuli on a task would tend to increase the vigilance 
decrement because of the channel switching of the brain in receiving the 
sttmuli. The Arousal Theory, on the other hand, would require the varied 
external stimuli to maintain the vigilance and decrease the vigilance 
decrement. Many researchers have conducted studies to support both theories. 
The results of these studies are usually interpreted as supporting the 
theory the researcher favored. 
Regardless of the theory or theories supported, the question of most 
concern might well be 11What techniques might be used in efforts to decrease 
the vigilance decrement in tasks and to increase the efficiency of people 
involved in vigilance tasks? 11 Some possible techniques are discussed below. 
One technique that could be used in vigilance tasks would be the 
introduction of artificial signals into the task display. Certain vigilance 
tasks lend themselves to this technique. A radar watch-stander at sea, for 
example, can become quite bored and lose his vigilance at watching a scope 
on which a 11blip 11 appears infrequently (there have been situations where no 
signals occurred for an entire four-hour watch). The introduction of false 
or artificial signals would probably help maintain his vigilance. In fact, 
the Navy often does this by scheduling training exercises during particularly 
long, boring watches. There are situations, however, where the introduction 
of artificial signals may be unfeasible. An example may be on an assembly line 
in a manufacturing plant. It would not be cost effective to deliberately flaw 
an occasional piece of merchandise just to enable inspectors to maintain 
their vigilance. 
Most studies agree that feedback is a means of decreasing vigilance 
decrement. This inv.olves informing the person performing the task that he 
had reacted to a signal in a proper manner or that he had missed a signal. 
Reinforcement of this sort has been shown to maintain a higher level of 
vigilance. Police departments have a sort of reinforcement lever in the 
case of missed signals--it is called a traffic ticket. It does wonders to 
ensure that, at least for awhile, the person will be more vigilant in 
recognizing and reacting to traffic signals such as stop signs, stop lights, 
and speed limit signs. In certain vigilance tasks some method may exist to 
inform the person perfonning the task of his results. In certain others, a 
means of such reinforcement may not exist. 
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A third technique to increase the vigilance efficiency may be to 
require the person to perform a second time-sharing task. This technique 
is suggested by the Arousal Theory. Signals from both tasks would be more 
frequent and varied than in a single task. Under the assumptions of the 
Arousal Theory, the vigi l ance of the person would be enhanced by the varied 
and frequent signals. C.H. Baker [2] reports a study in which it was shown 
that vigilance in a primary task was maintained at a high level when the 
person was perfonning a secondary vigilance task about which he was informed 
of the results. This may have application where i t is infeasible to re-
inforce the individual by informing him of the results of his primary task. o 
If it is possible to require the person to perform a secondary vigilance 
task on which he can be i nformed of the results, hi s vigilance on the primary 
task should be increased. 
In a somewhat similar technique to that of feedback, knowledge of the 
error criticality may, in certain vigilance jobs, tend to enhance vigilance. 
If a person knows that to make an error in certain jobs may cost him his 
life (as in a combat situation) his vigilance is likely to be maintained 
for a long period of time. If a person is operating some piece of machinery 
and knows that to make an error of a certa i n type may cost him his hand, his 
eye, or his job, he will tend to be more vigilant. The problems inherent in 
this technique are obvious. Few vigilance tasks are of this nature and people, 
even in critical situations, do tend to lose vigilance over long periods of 
time, particularly periods of inactivity. A sentry on duty in a war zone, 
for example, may lose vigilance if, over a period of time, nothing threaten-
ing from the enemy occurs. 
Many studies have shown, and the Arousal Theory suggests, that many 
and varied external stimuli prcmote better vigilance efficiency. Listening 
to the radio while driving or occasionally glancing at the passing scenery 
has been shown to maintain a higher level of vigilance required for driving. 
In any task, an occasional novel stimulus has been shown to regenerate a 
higher level of vigilance. 
A similar technique is to allow frequent rest periods to combat fatigue 
and to allow varied stimulation. A period of time spent on the vigilance 
task, followed by a rest period approximately half the time spent on the 
task, may generate higher levels of vigilance. Many tasks or the numbers 
of personnel involved do not allow this technique, however. The use of 
rested personnel to carry on the task is an obvious technique, although it 0 
is not always possible. 
A technique of making the signals in a vigilance task multiple-sense 
signals has been shown to decrease the vigilance decrement. A signal which 
activates more than one sense--that is, simultaneously seeing and hearing 
the signal--is more likely to be detected than one which activates one sense 
only. This technique may be useful only in certain tasks in which the signal 
is controllable. 
There are other techniques to combat the increase in vigilance 
decrement, in addition to the ones discussed above. The use of economic 




of the environment of the task are a few others. Other techniques may be 
suggested by conman sense or experience on a given vigilance task. There 
are no 11pat 11 answers on how to maintain high vigilance on these types of 
tasks. Each type of vigilance task, whether driving a car, operating a 
machine or standing a radar watch, may use any, none, or several of the 
techniques discussed above. 
In conclusion, there are many factors that affect vigilance efficiency 
in tasks, theories proposed to try to explain the decrease in vigilance 
efficiency {the vigilance decrement), and techniques shown to be effective 
i'n certain situations in combatting the vigilance decrement. A manager or 
anyone tasked with doing or supervistng a vigilance task should be familiar 
with these factors and techniques. One hundred per cent efficiency is 
never obtainable in any task. The consequences of a lessening in vigilance 
in any task must be a consideration in the formation, supervision, and 
techniques used in the task. The better infonned people are, concerning 
vigilance tasks and the vigilance decrement in tasks, the easier it will be 
to find a practical and feasible technique to combat vigilance inefficiency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Chief of the Boat in a submarine is in a unique position when 
the organization of a submarine is compared to that of other ships. He 
works directly for the Executive Officer and has considerable responsi-
bility in the conduct of the daily routine, training, and maintenance of 
morale. His uniqueness is based on the fact that he is found outside the 
traditional chain of command found in most navy organizations, which has 
the commanding officer linked to the seaman apprentice through many layers 
of hierarchy. Virtually every submariner I have known has agreed that the 
COB is an invaluable addition to this traditional organizational structure. 
He can probably take a significant portion of the credit for the uniformly 
high level of performance and morale the submarine force has enjoyed over 
the years. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine briefly the role of the COB 
in an effort to determine why he has been so effective. A secondary motive, 
and one that will remain largely unarticulated, is to suggest that your 
ship or canmand might benefit by the addition of a similar position. 
The examination will be from the perspective of interpersonal com-
munications. This aspect of human interactions has received increasing 
attention in recent years as an important factor in organization structure 
[10:235] [2:24], and it appears to explain a lot about how the COB can 
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operate. The first section will deal with communication in organizations 
in general, touching on the importance of communication, barriers to 
coomunication, and ways to improve communication. The second section will 
look closely at the COB himself in relation to the problems and recommenda-
tions noted in the first section. The final section will touch briefly 
on the COB role as seen in other organizations. 
COt,NUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
Importance. The Navy has long recognized the importance of interpersonal O 
communication within the command. ADM Cope in his book Command at Sea 
[4:451] quotes from the BuPers Manual concerning the Navy's policy on 
developing morale: 
"The objectives of the naval service must remain primary. 
Conflict between the needs of the service and the desire or in-
centives of an individual tends to destroy morale. Agreement clears 
the way for high morale. 
Each person must have a true understanding of the needs and 
policies of the service . The facts must get to all hands." 
Other articles contain the same message: "We must communicate with 
our men." Nothing is said about how to get the message across, however. 
The implication here, and the assumption made by many people is, "Tell him, 
and he's got it. 11 The ship's crew is usually considered to be a captive 
audience. The CO speaks, the Seaman hears and understands. [12:37] The 
facts indicate otherwise. How effective are your communications with 
subordinates? 50%? 75%? Numerous studies verify that, on the average, 
workers understand less than 25% of what their managers expected them to 
understand . [2:188] Perhaps you are twice as effective as the average. 
Then only half of your communications are lost! Perhaps we need to think 
more careful ly about canmunicating. 
The shipboard organization can be viewed as a message processing 
system. The organizat ion chart shows the channels where fonnal or approved 
communications can flow. However, infonnal communications surround and 
cut across many of these formal lines and divisions. Obviously, if the 
flow of messages (formal and infonnal) is good and understanding is high, 
the organization wi ll function well. [2:24] O 
Co1T111unication has been defined as "the process of passing information 
and understanding from one person to another. 11 [5: 179] It can be categor-
ized as bei ng one way or two way. Either way, it takes two people to effect 
a cornmunication--one to send, one to receive. The Executive Officer can 
write an i nstruction on leave-and-libe rty policy, but if no one reads it, 
there has been no communication. One-way communication from the CO down 
in the vertical military organization is obviously a necessary and proper 
way to operate in many instances. It is fast and orderly. One must keep 
in mind, though, that studies have shown one-way to be less accurate than 
two-way communication where the receiver can talk back to or querry the 




one-way flow (often because he is simply not sure of what is expected of 
him). The sender on the other hand usually prefers one-way flow, probably 
because it seems easier at the outset. 
Regardless of the type of communication, one-way or two-way, written 
or verbal, there are four basic categories of competence the sender can 
fall into: (l) Unconscious incompetence is where the individual's messages 
don't get through, and he doesn't know it. This is of course the most 
dangerous category to be in. (2) The conscious incompetent knows he has 
a problem and either runs away from it or sits down and analyzes it with 
the objective of improving his ability to communicate. (3) The unconscious 
competent is operating effectively, but doesn't know how he is doing it. 
He cannot help anyone else to improve his communication skills. (4) The 
conscious competent is in the best situation. He is usually effective and 
knows why his actions work or do not work. 12:132] Where do you fit? 
In summary, we see that the Navy encourages, indeed depends on, 
effective communication within the shipboard organization. This passing 
of information and understanding takes two people to work but can be either 
one way or two way. As noted above, people may be categorized according to 
their effectiveness as communicators. 
Barriers. There are many reasons why our communications are not as effec-
tive as we would like them to be. Most of these reasons may be looked 
upon as barriers to communications. We will now look at some of the more 
significant barriers. · 
The first and probably most serious barrier is that we are not 
taught effective oral communication in school. We communicate orally much 
more often than by any other method. [3:154] In fact, one study found of 
the 70% of the waking day that people spend communicating, 9% is by writing, 
16% by reading, and 75% is by talking and l i stening . [2:170] Of course, 
we all learned how to read and writ.e in school, but few people have ever 
had even one course in talking and listening. No wonder the measured 
effectiveness of oral communications is so low. 
Another barrier is the hierarchy or rank structure built into our 
organization. Even people who consider themselves equals have problems 
communicating. When people on different levels in an organization try to 
communicate, they have even more trouble. [2:38] The fact that one person 
has authority over the other generally inhibits the easy, honest inter-
change of ideas between them. 
Then there is the confusion people have between inference and observa-
tion. A person makes an observation (a car flashing a turn signal as it 
approaches the intersection). He assumes or infers that the driver intends 
to turn. He then forgets or is unaware that this is an inference, not a 
fact, and acts accordingly. He therefore fails to properly calculate the 
risk involved (in moving out into the intersection). [8:218] An example of 
this confusion of inference with observation that is familia r to most 
military people is the infamous confusion surrounding the radar contact held 
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on the Japanese planes coming in to bomb Pearl Harbor. The inference was 
made that these planes were a flight of U.S. planes expected at about the 
same time, so no further act ion was taken on the contact . 
"Bypassing" is the misinterpretation of the words or meaning of a 
message. The receiver hears the words, but assigns a meaning to them 
different frcxn that intended by the sender. [8:246] This can happen when 
a word has several meanings or when several words have the same meaning. 
Certainly the military stress on standard terminology and the use of () 
certain words to the exclusion of others (i.e., "shut" the vents vice 
11close 11 which rhymes with 11blows11) is an excellent way to avoid much by-
passing. 
11Allness 11 means that we abstract as we talk. We simply cannot say 
everything about everything, defining all terms and words and leaving 
nothing to the imagination. [8:312] We must be aware that no matter how 
careful we are in phrasing an order, no matter how clear and obvious the 
meaning is to us, the receiver of that order may not have sufficient in-
formation to arrive at the same meaning. An example of 11allness 11 is the 
exchange between ADM Zumwalt, CNO, and a seaman that was witnessed in the 
TV documentary on the New Navy earlier this year. The seaman asked 
essentially what the Admiral1s policy was on haircuts . ADM Zumwalt re-
sponded that his policies were well public ized and widely known and proceeded 
to ask if there was a particular instance that was bothering the seaman. 
It turned out that there was, and the seaman related the specific problem 
and received a satisfying answer. If ADM Zumwalt had not recognized that 
the seaman was abstracting and had simply answered the seaman's initial 
question with a repeat of the published policy, the seaman would have still 
been unhappy and no one would have been enlightened. 
Stereotyping is another barrier with which most of us are very 
familiar. One barrier that is a bit more subtl e is 11polarization . 0 
This is the trap of confusing a 11contrary 11 with a 11contradictory. 11 
A contradictory is an either-or situation where only one or the other 
alternative can occur. A contrary is a situation that appears contra-
dictory but is not because there are in fact more alternatives, usually 
a middle ground between the two extremes presented as the contrary. [8:356] 
The problem is that people often treat contraries as contradictories, 
thereby restricting their range of options. Polarization can be used on 0 
purpose as a way to delude others. For example, when the legendary CAPT 
Queeg was criticized for unusually hard treatment of subordinates, he would 
reply, 11Well, what do you want me to do--give him a commendation?11 [8:361] 
Was to im rove communications. Simply making a conscious effort to 
avo1 t e pitfa ls mentioned above is a good start. This can be very 
effective with one-way or downward conmunication. When considering good 
two-way communication and specifica l ly the upward or feedback phase, a 




s. I. Hayakawa talks about "Conditions of success in communications." 
[8:196] Those communicating must be aware of.certain things. One of these 
is the "sel~' concept. There is not only a person but also what that person 
thinks of himself. The self concept is the total of all the individual's 
experiences. It naturally influences how he communicates. This leads to 
differences in perception by two people of the same event which can then 
lead to misunderstanding and frustration. One of the conditions for suc-
cessful communications then is the recognition by each person of the other's 
self concept. How do we make this and other conditions right? 
Many people have given detailed guidelines for making the conditions 
right in order to improve upward communications. Luthans [10:253] lists 
five ways: (1) The grievance procedure, (2) The open-door policy, (3) 
Counseling, (4) Participative techniques, and (5) The ombudsman. Bonnann 
[2:151] in a little more detail lists eight: (1) Tell people you want 
feedback, (2) Spe.cify areas where feedback is desired, (3) Schedule regular 
feedback sessions, (4) Use silence to encourage feedback, (5) Watch for non-
verbal responses, (6) Ask questions, (7) Use statements that encourage feed-
back, and (8) Reward feedback. Gemmill gives three ways: (1) Reduce the 
degree of control the senior has over the junior's personal goals and there-
by reduce the fear of being penalized for providing unpleasant feedback, 
(2) Reward feedback, and (3) Reveal some of your own problems and feelings 
to subordinates. The one co1T111on thread that runs through all of these 
recommended methods is that the manager must actively work for feedback. 
Some methods listed are obviously more or less appropriate for shipboard 
application, but in any case the manager must take positive steps to obtain 
the desired result. 
One study of barriers to upward communication in several firms [13:5] 
found the upward communication generally good, but in instances where it was 
poor, the manager was usually at fault. Recommendations for improvement were 
again similar to those listed above. 
Another consideration is the vertical organization found in the 
military. A person with a problem generally would prefer to work on a 
peer basis [9:468], but aboard ship it is not usually possible to consult 
anyone who has more knowledge or training without using the organized 
structure. By entering the organization he puts himself in a position to be 
controlled by someone senior, a less than desirable situation from the 
viewpoint of someone who already has one problem. Awkward as it may sound. 
the solution to this problem might be to introduce into the organization a 
person who is not directly in the nonnal chain of command. 
The ombudsman concept as a means of improving communication deserves 
further comment. The ombudsman was created first in Sweden about 165 years 
ago. Starting in 1965, the system was widely publicized as being used 
effectively in the Danish government. The ombudsman was given significant 
formal power by the legislature and had the responsibility 11to inform him-
self constantly about the manner in which all officials within his jurisdiction 
perform their duty." [6:13] He had no power to specifically overturn 
decisions nor to intervene in judicial cases (although in some countries he 
does have this power). He could inspect, investigate on his own initiative, 
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or, as in most cases, respond to a complaint by an individ ual who felt he 
had been wronged in some way by the administration of the state . The 
ombudsman could not act unless all administrative remedies had been 
exhausted, and could decide at the outset whether the complaint contained 
sufficient grounds to justify an investigation. (In practice, only a 
very small percentage of complaints are actually investigated.) 
The ombudsman in Denmark has had considerable success by using a 
generally low-key, arbitration type of approach. He is not always concerned 
only with strict legal interpretation, rather he can and does recorrmend how 
th ings might be done better. His greatest success appears to be in the 
cases of indiv i duals who claim to have been denied established rights, 
although he has had some effect in areas of broader concern. One result 
of the ombudsman in Denmark has been to streamline the civil service and to 
increase the confidence of the average citizen in the civil service. There-
fore, we might say that he has improved communication within the civil 
service and between the civil service and the citizen. 
l 
One fina l thought on improving th~ climate and increasing feedback .•. 
consider the number of levels of hierarchy a person must go t hrough to get 
to the top. Let's assume for argument that the probability of getting your 
complai nt or question through one administrative level to the next (e.g., 
through the leading PO to the department CPO) is 0.5. I f the probability 
of getting through each level is the same, 0.5, then the probability of 
getting through two levels (to the department head) is 0.5 x 0.5 = 0.25; 
through 3 levels {to the XO) is 0.125, through four levels is 0.063. 
If 0.5 probability sounds low, let's try 0.8. The probability of getting 
through four levels then is 0.4. At one time or another, each one of us 
has felt helpless when dealing with a large,hierarchical structure,be it 
the Navy, a state government, or the Internal Revenue Service. The farther 
we are from the top, the more impossible it seems to gain access to a level 
at which satisfactory action can be obtained. 
There are many ways, then, to improve communications and to encourage 
feedback, from listening more carefully and asking questions, to actually 
modifying the organization by either appointing a special person to handle 
complaints or by reducing the number of levels of hierarchy in some way. 
Certainly many of the suggestions mentioned in this section should receive 
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careful attention by our officers and senior petty officers. If this were 0 
done, it is possible that many of our present problems would disappear, or 
at least be brought out into the open where they could eventually be 
resolved. 
Some positive steps in this regard have been taken in recent years. 
Z-GRAM 48, Programs for People, set up Pers-Pas a place where any indi-
vidual in the Navy may turn for assistance in matters of conditions of 
service and personal affairs. This is in effect a variation on the om-
budsman concept and, additionally, makes it a bit easier to get high 
level attention to a problem. 
In a similar way, the establishment of the Master Chief Petty 




action from a high level where the nonnal route up the chain of command fails 
to resolve the problem. 
Z-GRAM 54, CNO Discussions with Navy Personnel, was ADM Zumwalt1s 
personal effort to achieve more feedback by taking many of the above steps 
simultaneously. Indeed, the Z-GRAM concept itself is an effort to get 
around the tremendous number of hierarchical levels and to achieve a modicum 
of direct communication, both down and up. 
In short, everyone in a management position must be aware of potential 
communications problems, and should take some positive steps to assure 
adequate communications. Now, where does the COB fit into all of this? 
THE CHIEF OF THE BOAT 
Duties and Res~onsibilities. The COB is basically an administrative 
assistant tote Executive Officer. As such he is responsible for super-
vising the activities of the crew as a whole. He assists the XO in admin-
istering the enlisted personnel; the Watch, Quarter and Station Bill; 
assignment of bunks; details to cleaning stations; and the lucky bag. In 
addition, he assists the Qualification Officer in running the Enlisted 
Qualification Program. Organizationally, he is the Executive Petty Officer 
and as such is responsible for interdepartment coordination at the leading 
PO level. [14:Art. 1202] The abbreviated organization chart in Figure 1 
shows the position of the COB. 
FIGURE 1 
















COB as Communicator. A glance at Figure 1 shows that the COB is removed 
from the traditional chain of command (as are many staff personnel), but 
his many duties and responsibilities for the crew provide him with reason to 
have frequent, direct contact with virtually every man aboard. This puts 
him in a unique position of being able to by-pass the chain of command with 
communications going both down and up. This is not to imply that he acts 
as a perpetual short circuit, preventing the chain of conmand from function-
ing. In fact, the co11111unications going down are nonnally specialized, 
relating to one of his specific duties. Because this conduit exists, how-
ever, it is also available as an alternate route for communications going up. 
It is, if the COB will listen. Naturally, the COB is just as likely as 
anyone else to fall prey to the many pitfalls mentioned earlier. 
In addition to the specific duties enumerated for the COB, my exper-
ience has been that a COB can, and often will, take it upon himself to 
search out problems and to report those he is unable to resolve to the XO. 
Whether obtained on his own initiation or on that of the individual with 
a problem, if the problem is outside the boundaries of the COB's specific 
duties, he is then in the position of an ombudsman. He can consider the 
problem and decide whether it merits investigation. If so, he might do some 
investigating himself or report directly to the XO. 
Why woul d anyone approach the COB with a problem instead of or after 
talking to his leading PO or chief? We saw earlier that a person with a 
problem prefers to work on a peer basis. Failing this, it would seem reason-
able that he would next search out someone with authority but not his own 
immediate boss who has such powers as the writing of performance evaluations, 
check-off of practical factors for advancement in rate, and the like. While 
occasionally involved in such matters, the COB is usually somewhat removed 
from this direct power over many individuals. Even those who do work 
directly for him only do so temporarily or for short periods . Therefore, the 
COB would seem to be a logical choice for some men to approach with a personal 
problem. 
In summarizing this section, the COB (1) provides another conmunica-
tion link between the XO and those in the lower rates; (2) can act as an 
ombudsman for personal problems; (3) can perhaps be somewhat more approach-
able than other pnr or officers in the chain of command. A note of caution 
0 
is in order here . No claim is made that the COB is a panecea nor that he Q 
can take all the credit for the successes of the submarine force. Indeed, 
some individual COBs have doubtless been singularly ineffective. Certainly 
the job calls for some special psychological traits that are not found in 
all men. However, most COBs have been very successful in assisting the 
command, and they have proven their worth to the submarine force. 
THE COB IN OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
Other organizations outside the submarine community have adopted the 
COB type of position in recent years. The MCPO of the Navy was mentioned 
earlier. His official function is similar to the unofficial functions just 




The ombudsman concept itself is becaning more popular in civilian 
corporations. The year 1971 saw several major companies including Chrysler 
Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and RCA Corporation appo1nt top level 
executives as consumer representatives or ombudsmen. [11:39] The main aim 
of these companies in making this move was to improve service. This is only 
one step away from having an ombudsman for employee affairs. Even Navy wives 
~ave an ombudsman ow, thanks to Z-GRAM 24. 
What about your command? Would it benefit from the incorporation of 
a position similar to that of COB? I cannot say that it would. I can say 
that it has worked so well for me and others that it is worth a few moments 
of your consideration. We see it working well in a small organization, 
the submarine. We see it off to a good start in very large organizations 
like the MCPO of the Navy. Whether it could be adapted to a large warship 
such as a CVA or LPH, only people with extensive experience in those ships 
could say. If interpersonal communications are one of your problems, 
perhaps you should investigate this concept. 
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I NT RO DUCT ION 
America is experiencing a social revolution based on the changing 
cultural values of the youth of the nation. The social revolution is an 
outgrowth of the counter-cultural values developed on America's college 
campuses in the 1960's. The impact of this social revolution on society 
and on the work place in particular over the next few years will be pro-
found. [19:16] 
American institutions (family, religion, government, military, 
business, etc.) are not sure how to react to the pressures of social change 
being brought to bear by the youth of America. The problem involves, first, 
a policy decision by top management recognizing that the organization has 
social responsibilities to society. Next is the problem of defining these 
responsibilities. Definition must be followed by the setting of goals or 
objectives. The last and most difficult steps are modifying the organiza-
tional structure to implement a policy of social responsibility and the 
setting of dollar values in a budget for social responsibility goals. 
This paper will briefly describe the historical background of the con-
cept of social responsibility in America; identify and discuss the endo-
genous and exogenous social forces that are causing changes in the military 
and business institutions; describe how the ·military and business have 
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reacted to the forces of social change; and prescribe a general course of 
action to assist organizations in effecting the required changes. 
BACKGROUND 
The government's responsibilities to society were established in the 
Constitution and have been reaffirmed in many legislative acts and judicial 
decisions. It has taken almost two hundred years for the democratic and 
liberal philosophy of social responsibility, as expressed in the late 
Seventeenth Century by the Enlightenment philosopher, John Locke, to o 
tmpact on managerial thought in America. Locke's ideas that God's Natural 
Law provides that all rational men are equal and independent and that they 
have a right to life, health, liberty and possessions, are expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence and reflected in the Constitution . Also seen 
in these docunents are Locke' s concepts: that each individual in society 
enters into an explicit or implied social contract with his government to 
ensure these rights; that only those rights which are absolutely necessary 
for the general good are voluntarily given up to the government whose pur-
pose and reason for existence is the promotion of the good of mankind; 
and that government is a necessary evil that is best when it governs least. 
Within this democratic milieu, management philosophy in both public 
and private institutions has remained predominantly authoritarian. Until 
recently, the management of private institutions (business} generally has 
not found it necessary or profitable to consider the good of mankind in its 
decision-making analysis. 
Business management in partic ular has operated on the basic assump-
tion that primary organizational goals should be: continued existence, 
profit, and expansion. The profit motive philosophy is reflected in the 
statement made by the country's largest manufacturing company, 11What is 
good for General Motors is good for America. 11 The rationale for profit 
maximization is that, "under competitive conditions profit is the measure 
of efficiency; it indicates that the value of corporate output to society is 
greater than the resources taken from society in producing the mixture of 
goods and services delivered to the market. Therefore, the achievement of 
maximum profit means that business is meeting its social responsibility 
in the fullest sense . 11 [15:64] 
It is a relatively recent phenomenon that society i s demanding that 0 
organizational management become more liberal and democratic, and that 
organizations recognize that one of their most important goals must be the 
promotion of the good of society even at the expense of their other 
primary goals. 
Society is making its desires known and is effecting change on man-
agement thoughtthrough the interaction of social, economic and political 
forces, Underlying these forces are: an awareness or recognition of new 
values; a growing understanding of the interdependence between organizat i onal 
actions, the environment and society; and the demand that institutions such 
as the military, religion, business , universities, and the family become 
more l i beral, egalitarian, and more democratic. 
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It is the thesis of this paper that evolving social forces such as: 
concern for environmental protection, democratization of institutional life, 
egalitarianism, anti-war sentiments, shifting emphasis from a work ethic 
to leisure time pursuits, concern for the social welfare of citizens, etc., 
••• are causing organizations to modify their policies, plans, and practices. 
The nature and extent of these modifications will be explored, conclusions 
drawn on future developments, and appropriate recommendations made. 
IDENTIFICATION A D DISCUSSION OF FORCES ACTING ON ORGANIZATIONS 
It has generally been accepted that the military exists to serve 
society but it is still a debatable question whether business exists to 
serve itself, society, or some combination of the two. The Committee on 
Economic Development [7:16] stated that: 
Today it is clear that the terms of the (Implicit Social) 
contract between society and business are, in fact, changing 
in substantial and important ways .•• Inasmuch as business 
exists to serve society, its future will depend on the quality 
of management's response to the changing expectations of the 
public. 
The Committee [7:21] further suggested that, "the great growth of corpora-
tions in size, market power, and impact on society has naturally brought with 
it a commensurate growth in responsibilities; in a democratic society, power 
sooner or later begets equivalent accountability." 
Endogenous forces have been observed operating in the military and in 
business organizations. In both institutions it was the dissatisfaction of 
younger personnel that prompted change from within. 
In the Navy, a very low first term reenlisbnent rate and large numbers 
of junior officers resigning at the end of their initial obligation caused 
the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, to take extraordinary steps, 
in the fonn of his now famous Z-GRAM directives, to liberalize the Navy and 
make it more responsive to the new values and needs of the younger personnel. 
The Anny's liberalization is epitomized by their advertising campaign slogan, 
11The Modern Army Wants to Join You.11 , 
0 In the business world there are indications that some young executives 
are pressuring present corporate leaders to include social as well as 
economic values in corporate decision analysis [4:49-61]. There are 
growing instances of prospective business executives, lawyers and accountants, 
choosing to work directly for the good of society with groups like Ralph 
Nader's Raiders rather than for profit-seeking corporate enterprises. 
Business recruiters are finding MBA students harder to hire because they are 
questioning the products and practices of corporations and are generally 
more doubtful of traditional corporate values than their predecessors. 
[4:50] 
Blue collar workers have traditionally been viewed as being religious, 
individualistic, patriotic, hard working, moralistic, success seeking, 
conservative, and generally representative of mainstream American cultural 
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values. Recently, the younger blue collar workers started to, 11go beyond 
good pay and economic security, toward other values •.• they want jobs that 
provide self-expression and self-fulfillment, and only 3 out of every 10 
feel their jobs offer them a good future. They want jobs that offer special 
forms of education and advancement through which they can seek tneir new 
aspirations." [19:16] These goals sound more like goals that would be 
advocated by college-educated executives than goals of blue collar workers. 
Daniel Yankelovich, a major public opinion researcher, has found, from a 
sampling of the 25 million Americans between 16 and 25 years old, that, 
"What's happened is that this social revolution, which started on campus 
(in the l960's), has begun to spread and it has spread particularly now to 
the other young people." [19:16] Yankelovich also found that, "the non-
college group's attitudes (the blue-collar workers) were what the college 
group's attitudes had been only four years ago, in 1969.11 [19:16] Table 
I indicates the direction and extent of the shift in attitudes of today's 
16-25 year-old noncollege blue-collar workers. 
TABLE I 
1969 1973 
1. Would welcome more acceptance of sexual freedom 
2. Casual premarital sexual relations are morally wrong 
3. Relations between consenting homosexuals are 
morally wrong 
4. Having an abortion is morally wrong 
5. Living a clean moral life is a very important life 
value 
6. Religion is a very important value 
7. Patriotism is a very important value 
8. Believe that hard work always pays off 











SOURCE: DANIEL YANKELOVICH (Survey in Spring 1973 of 2,516 noncollege 
youth between 16 and 25 years old), "Counter-Culture Values 
Spreading, may alter workplace," Monterey Peninsula Hera_ld, 











The shift in values represented by items one through six in Table I 
are impacting primarily on the family and religious institutions . Item 
seven is having an effect on the all-vo l unteer mi l itary. Items si x, eight, 
and nine are causing changes in business institut i ons. The changes affecting 
the military and business will be discussed later. 
That there has been a major shift i n youth's attitudes and values can 
be seen from a comparison of Yankelovi ch1 s f i ndings in 1973 with pollster 
Louis Harris' survey conducted in 1970 of a comparable but sl i ghtly younger 







LIFE recently (1970) commissioned Louis Harris and Associates to 
interview a national cross section of the 26 mil lion Americans who 
are between the ages of 15 and 21. Their views on a broad range of 
social questions are remarkably moderate, even conservative. In 
sum, they describe a rather tolerant, relaxed group whose attitudes 
and expectations on a great many subjects differ very little from 
their parents'. As Harris reports, "The majority of youth listens 
to the rhetoric of dissent, picks what it wants, then slowly 
weaves it into the dominant social pattern." 
Thus far endogenous forces have been discussed and it was suggested 
that there are divergent value systems between the "older" executives on 
the one hand, i.e., those presently in top management positions in business 
and the military, and the younger executives and blue collar workers 
(junior officers and young enlisted men in the military) on the other hand. 
Anthony Athas sees the divergent value systems vis-a-vis organizations, as a 
spectrum extending from objective to subjective values. Traditional organiza-
tional values are located at the objective end of the value spectrum and the 
new youth values are located near the subjective end of the spectrum. 
(See TABLE I I) 
TABLE II 




Emphasis in Decision Processes 
Affecting Persons 




























Man as I 




SOURCE: Anthony Athas, "Is the Corporation Next to Fall?" Harvard Business 
Review (January-February 1970), p. 58. 
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In addition to endogenous forces for change--those forces initiated 
by the young executives and workers within organ i zations--there are exo-
genous forces that are being applied on organizations by the youth within 
society; ethnic minorities; consumer protection movements, regional ly 
oriented ecology and antipollution-minded environmental protectionists; 
intellectuals concerned by the limits of the earth to sustain continued 
population, pollution, and economic growth; urban renewal advocates; 
women's rights advocates; and the public in general. The pressures of 
the various groups are brought to bear through direct action (protests), 
moral suasion (books, magazines, newspaper, radio and television), exer- O 
cise of stockholders' rights to vote, l egislat i ve action , judicial action, 
economic action (boycott of goods), and social action (refusal to work). 
Underlying much of the social unrest that has resulted in the endo-
genous and exogenous forces acting on America's i nstitutions are factors 
inherent in the American post-industrialized society . Some of these factors 
are: Increased overall population, a more youthful population, early matur-
ation, mass education, increased higher education, greater affluence, grow-
ing permissiveness, delayed adult role assumption, mass communications 
resulting in greater awareness of socia l problems, mass transportation, 
technological and scientific advancements, the increasi ng pace and diversity 
of life, and a general disillusionment with society's abi li ty to solve 
social problems. One major result of these factors has been to create a 
youth culture with different values than previous generations of Americans. 
Donald M. Kendall, President of Pepsi Co., Inc., made a prophetic 
speech in 1971 [11:245]: 
There is today--whether you accept i t or not--a massive generation 
of purposeful young people who have been taught and encouraged to 
challenge every institution i n America .•. and to change everyone that 
cannot justify itself in terms of value, meaning and contribution to 
1 if e. So far the "cha l l enge-and-change11 generation has focussed 
most of its attention on institutions near at hand .•• colleges, ROTC 
Units, draft boards and recruitment centers •.. and against ••. poverty, 
pollution and prejudice. The next target . • . is likely to be American 
business. Business equates t o the Establishment. 
As Kendall predicted, American business has indeed become a target 
of change-oriented youth and minority groups. Institutions throughout 
America are beginning to respond to the growing politica l consciousness 
of these socially progressive groups. A discussion of the impact of the 
forces for social change on the military and on business follows. 
MILITARY AND BUSINESS REACTIONS TO THE WINOS OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
MILITARY 
The All-Voluntary military i s a direct result of social press ures 
brought to bear on the government by activist anti-war yotJth [16:56-57, 







initiated in 1973, are yet to be felt. Some critics fear a predominantly 
black mercenary military made up of lower socio-economic personnel. 
Proponents of the change say that a higher intellectual level of personnel 
can be obtained through a selective recruitment process. 
A top-level military management decision to implement a policy of 
Equal Opportunity has restructured military organizations to include, on 
almost all levels of the organizational hierarchy, a Human Resources 
Coordinating Officer and a Human Resources Council. 
Table III lists the goals established by one Navy organization's 
Human Resources Council to implement a policy of"equality of opportunity 
and treatment for all personnel irrespective of race, creed, color, sex 
or national origin~ [14:1] 
TABLE III 
GOALS OF MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN 
GOAL 1. To attract to the Navy people with ability, 
dedication, and capacity for growth. Speci-
fically, the Navy must be able to obtain the 
very best talent available in this nation 
regardless of race, religion, creed, economic 
background, or national origin. 
GOAL 2. To provide real opportunity for all personnel 
of the Department of the Navy to rise to as 
high a level of responsibility as possible, 
dependent only on individual talent and 
diligence. 
GOAL 3. To make service in the Department of the Navy 
a model of equal opportunity for all regardless 
of race, creed, religion, sex, or national origin. 
The Navy must strive to elevate the dignity of 
each individual and eliminate all vestiges of 
discrimination so that all members of the naval 
service can be proud to serve. 
GOAL 4. To help each service member readjust to civilian 
life at the termination of military service. 
GOAL 5. To participate in the progressive improvement of 
social-cultural interactions in our society by 
utilization of our human, economic, and physical 
resources while maintaining full effectiveness 
in the performance of our primary mission. 
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Under Secretary of the Army, Hennan R. Staudt, recently submitted 
a list of proposals to deploy the, "Vast resources and capabilities of 
the anned forces to moderate U.S. social deficiencies. 11 [12:10] One of 
Secretary Staudt's proposal s was: 
As detente becomes real and as the all-volunteer force becomes 
an unqualified success, more money and time can be spent on 
projects not related to training and readiness ..• 
National programs in health care, disaster aid, physical fitness, 
summer youth programs, vocational training for unemployed, under-
employed, canmunity day-care centers, parks-forest restoration, 
are some items that could be developed into national programs. 
Under conservative congressional pressure and professional mil itary objec-
tions, the Anny withdrew Secretary Staudt's proposals. [12:10] 
Secretary Staudt 1 s attempt at a proposal for social responsibility 
for the military clearly went too far--it would have turned the mili tary 
organization into a social welfare organization. Goal five, in Table II I , 
has the same purpose as Secretary Staudt's proposal ,but by adding the 
caveat, 11 ••• while maintai ning full effectiveness in the performance of 
our primary mission," it relegates, in this author's opinion, the socia l 
responsibility goal to a more proper subordinate position. 
Another change in the military, resulting from equal opportunity 
forces, is seen in the latest revision to the Naval Officer's perfonnance 
evaluation instructions (Fitness Reports). There is now a section titled, 
"Equal Opportunity" which requires an evaluation of an officer's ability 
or performance in the fol l owing areas [SJ: 
l. Takes effective action to increase his own and his subordinate's 
racial awareness. 
2. Initiates actions in supporting the Navy's Equal Opportunity 
Goals, programs and directives. 
3. Considers minority groups in planning and implementation of 
personnel actions. 
The Navy has taken initial steps to provide an equal opportunity for 
women in the Navy. There is now one woman flag officer; a few women have 
been designated qualified Naval aviators, and one noncombatant ship has 
women assigned as part of its crew. Earlier mention was made of Admiral 
Zumwalt's Z-GRAMS and the Army's recruiting slogan as examples of organiza-
tional change in response to social pressures. 
In summary then, the Military Establishment is responding to forces 
requiring increased organizational social responsibility . Personnel policy 
changes; pollution control programs; and social programs, e.g., project 
100,000, project transition, and project BOOST, are some examples of the 









Business organizations have also been responding to the forces de-
manding acknowledgment of a sense of social responsibility. In 1971 a 
non-profit organization, Human Resources Network, was established to 
canpile data on the social action projects of American corporations. 
The results of their first year's research indicated that only about 10 
per cent of American corporations have social action programs or are will-
i'ng to speak about them. Only 250 of the 2300 corporations queried on their 
social action programs responded with data on what they were doing and at 
what cost in the social action area. The result of the study was the 
publication of a compendium called "Profiles of Involvement." It includes 
a description of 535 social-action projects of 186 of the nation's largest 
corporations. Typical of the projects described in the three-volume work 
were the following: urban development, drug education, and consumer 
safety. A major conclusion of the study was that, "There really are an 
overwhelming number of top companies that are doing absolutely nothing •• • 
We found that, in a lot of companies, social action means how much they 
gave to the Red Cross last year." [10:96] The study has acted as a 
consciousness-raising tool and has proven useful in some practical business 
investment decisions; e.g., U.S. Steel Corporation after ignoring the 
initial study,has decided it wants its social-action efforts publicized in 
the next revision to the study and the "First Spectrum Fund, a New York 
mutual fund that specializes in stock of socially responsible companies, 
says that Profiles has been helpful in making investment decisions for his 
finn. 11 [10:96] 
One of the most effective means of forcing business to adopt social 
responsibility policies has been legal action brought by the Labor Depart-
ment, the Justice Department and the Equal Opportunity Commission at the 
instigation of groups interested in peace, environmental protection, 
consumer protection and egalitarianism, e.g., National Organization of 
Women (NOW), National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), Ralph Nader's Consumer Protection Groups (Nader's Raiders), 
Public Advocates (a San Francisco public interest law firm), Investor 
Responsibility Research, Inc. (IRRI), The Clergy and Laity Concerned 
(CALC), The Project on Corporate Responsiblity, and The Citizens Action 
Program (CAP). Just how effective these efforts have been will be seen 
in the following examples. 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company has agreed in the past two 
years, in separate government sex-discrimination suits, to grant $45 
million in back pay to their nonmanagement employees and to grant $7 
million in back pay and $23 million in first-year wage adjustments to 
lower and middle management employees to compensate for pay discrimination. 
Thus AT&T has agreed to pay out $75 million to compensate employees for 
sex-discrimination in hiring, compensation, and promotion policies and 
practices. An AT&T spokesman stated, 11We feel the new eromotional program 
makes equal opportunity a reality for all our people. L3:4] 
The Bank of America recently announced, "It has tentatively agreed 
to increase the proportion of women officers in the bank to 40 per cent by 
the end of 1978 and to invest $3.75 million in training women for promo-
tions." [9:l] It was estimated that as a result of the promotions women 
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will now receive, it will cost the Bank of America about $10 million a 
year in additional salaries. 
In May 1974 the American steel i ndustry agreed to pay more than $30 
million in back wages to women and minority workers for past sex and racial 
bi'as in job assignments. "The agreement with nine major firms and the 
United Steel Workers Union provides new hiring goals that could vastly 
expand the number of women in steel mil ls and blacks and Mexican-Ameri cans 
in high-paid skilled jobs." [17: 1] 
Another method used to force business to accept social responsi bilit ies 
has been the use of proxy votes at stockholder meetings. Individuals and 
activist groups are challenging corporate managements on issues such as: 
"Corporate investment in South Africa (where Aparthi ed is a national pol icy); 
minority hiring; broadeni ng the membership of boards of directors; and dis-
closure of military contract business, political contributions, and lobbying 
activities." [2:76-78] 
The proxy method has not had anywhere near the success of the legal 
action method thus far, but as institutional i nvestors become more active 
in the fight for social responsibility ,corporations will find it more 
diff i cult to ignore corporate social responsibility proposals. For examp1e, 
there are 50 institutions (universities, foundations, banks, mutual funds, 
and insurance companies) that support (by selective investments) Investor 
Responsibility Research, Inc., in its missi on to corporate policy changes in 
many social areas, e.g., South African investment, equal employment oepor-
tunity, strip mining, nuclear power safety, and employment for women L2:76-78]. 
The trend is clearly discernible, corporations are becoming aware that 
they must respond to social criticism and take positive action to hel p 
alleviate the socia l ills of society, even if it means reduced profits. The 
final section of thi s paper will prescribe a general course of action to 
assist organi zations in effecting changes to accommodate new social goals. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This author has concluded that: 
1. Social responsibility wil l be a necessary policy of all organiza-
0 
tions--p ublic and private--in the near future in America. 0 
2. Changes in organizational structure are required to carry out 
socia l responsibilities. 
3. Executives must be held accountab 1 e for the effects of organi za-
ti ona l deci si ons on society. 
4. Social costs and benefits must be evaluated, measured, and 
assigned dollar values for budgeting and financial accounting 
purposes. 
5. De facto, a reverse di scr imination for white males, particularly 
those in management, will be an inevitable result of the push to 
advance women and members of racial minorities into higher paying, 




6. Though some progress has been made in the military and 
business towards putting social responsibility policies 
i'nto effect; there is a great area for improvement. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The problem of how to react to the pressures of social change, as 
stated in the introduction to this paper, suggests an outline for its own 
solution. Once top management recognizes that there is a problem, the 
first step is to promulgate a policy statement that acknowledges that the 
organization has social responsibilities to society. 
The second step should be the creation of a center of social respon-
sibility within the organization to define what the social responsibilities 
of the organization are and to detennine how best to meet them. CBS, Inc., 
for example, acknowledging the fact that, "business cannot be governed by 
the profit motive alone,' .•• announced formation of an internal department 
of corporate responsibility designed to' advise the management of CBS, 
including all operating divisions and subsidiaries, on activities which 
further the corporation's policy of displaying good citizenship in conducting 
the various business in which it is engaged." [6:30] CBS made the department 
head a vice president, corporate responsibility. 
The third step should be the setting of goals and objectives by the 
responsible department. The goals could include among other things, equal 
opportunity for minority hiring and promotion; urban renewal projects; 
pollution abatement; community health and education improvements; and im-
provement of the organization's public image. 
Last, but not least, a method should be found to measure and report 
costs and benefits of social responsibility programs. At present, it is 
generally true that costs required to meet social responsibilities are 
absorbed into labor and production costs and not accounted for or budgeted 
separately. Benefits resulting from social responsibility expenditures are 
usually not quantified and matched against their costs because it is extremely 
difficult to measure the benefits and to assign dollar values to them. One 
company, Abt Associates, Inc., has been helping clients work on social audits 
and has come up with a fonnat for measuring a company's social contributions. 
0 [18;89] 
The recommendations listed above are general in nature because specific 
recommendations must be tailored to individual organizations. This author 
agrees with Peter Drucker in his analysis of the problem and his rec011111endations. 
Drucker. says that, 11The new demand is for business to make social values and 
and begin to create freedan for the individual, and altogether to produce the 
good society." [8 :81] 
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